Any resident of Tshwane who votes for the DA and Cilliers Brink is no different to a rural Eastern Cape resident voting for the ANC, an MK supporter voting for its opposition to corruption or voting for the PA in Beaufort West for Gayton’s promise to turn the town into Dubai. It would be a vote for bad government from a candidate or party with whom a voter has historically identified, willfully or subconsciously ignoring the abundance of evidence of the failed legacy of that party or candidate.
Strong words, right? Fair enough, but these words can be backed up when you consider the following review of the DA’s track record in Tshwane over the 8 years from 2016 to 2024. Every substantiation outlined below is a verifiable and objective fact that can only be ignored by those who do not want facts anywhere near their political choices.
One of the greatest hallmarks of the DA’s track record in Tshwane was its decimation of the finances of the city. When Cilliers Brink left office liquidity in the city stood at 0.6 – for those non-accountants out there anything less than 1 means the city cannot meet its obligation and, were it a business, it would have been liquidated.
The clearest indication of the problem was the growth in debt to ESKOM rising from nothing in 2020 to R6.7 billion in 2024 with ESKOM threatening to cut supply to the city. This shows that the city received payments for electricity from residents and, rather than using revenue from electricity to pay ESKOM as a bulk supplier, they used the funds to pay other obligations that they were unable to pay. In governance terms this is the equivalent of using one credit card to pay off another. When Brink tried to scandalize water tanker expenditure in the city, he inadvertently drew attention to the fact that R179 million in invoices for water tankers incurred under his tenure, had to be paid by Moya’s government because the city was too bankrupt to pay its suppliers.
Service delivery is never insulated from the collapse of municipal finances. In 2016 the City of Tshwane’s capital budget for new infrastructure and renewing old infrastructure was R4 billion. In 2023, for a larger city with greater needs, this had been eroded to just R2 billion. When one factors in just inflation over this time, not even considering the increased charges to residents in this time, this amounts to a 64% decrease in the city’s capital budget. The DA and Brink do not have the intellect to recognize that so now, in opposition, they campaign on the ashes of the infrastructure they collapsed.
The Auditor General (AG) provides the next part of my case. From 2010 to 2021 the City of Tshwane receives unqualified audit opinions – the second highest rating. Then in the financial year ending May 2022, under the DA, it received an adverse audit outcome – the worst outcome available to the AG, citing financial misrepresentations, material irregularities and collapse in the city’s financial health.
From the AG we move to the Hammanskraal Water Crisis which ultimately claimed the lives of 32 residents from cholera in 2023 and denied thousands of people their constitutionally protected right to clean water for years (while invoicing them for it every month). In 2019, under the DA, the R296 million tender to address this crisis through the upgrade of the Rooiwal Wastewater Treatment Plant was awarded to two entities owned by tenderpreneur Edwin Sodi. The ventures had no experience in this line of work, and they lacked the finances to procure the initial equipment or establish the site. The inevitable failures that followed prolonged the water crisis in this community and, in part, led to the deaths of those 32 people. When called upon by their coalition partners to investigate, the DA dragged its feet and resisted, failing even to blacklist Sodi as a service provider.
Anyone remember the Kratos Consortium unsolicited bid in 2023 when DA mayor Randall Williams attempted to force a R26 billion unsolicited bid down the throats of his coalition partners? The agreement was vague and open-ended and believed it was going to cost Tshwane billions in hidden costs. When coalition partners queried this the mayor pressed on in violation of his own coalition agreement. Recordings emerged revealing the mayor addressing municipal officials and intimidating them when they raised legitimate concerns about the legality and cost of the deal and directed to proceed on a procurement decision prohibited for politicians to be involved in. It turned out that Randall Williams’ brother had facilitated the proposal which included a lucrative facilitation deal.
Turn your mind back to the strike in Tshwane in 2023 when municipal services collapsed in the city. It arose because the city, under the DA, had concluded a three-year wage agreement with workers offering sub-inflation increases against which they reneged on two of the three years of the agreement. This was another sign of the financial distress described earlier. The problem is that such an agreement is binding in law in South Africa unless renegotiated by both parties and Brink and the DA, clearly after watching a Margaret Thatcher documentary that week, decided this was a hill to mount a public chest-thumping display for their constituents. Coalition partners implored a negotiated solution to no avail and, in 2025, the city was required to backpay over a billion rand to the workers in one of many ways in which the DA and Brink’s failures reached beyond the grave of their term to impede Nasiphi Moya’s turnaround efforts.
And, just for fun, who can forget the unique circumstances of the departure of DA mayor Stevens Mokgalapa in 2020 when an audio recording emerged of him having sex with one of his DA MMCs in the office? Another low for Tshwane in a lone line of lows.
Everything I have described above is verifiable, objective facts. Objectively, the DA and Brink’s tenure in Tshwane has been comparatively amongst the worst of any party or leader in local government. The only reason to ignore them would be because these facts clash with one’s identity politics and arising voting intention. But make no mistake, a vote for Cilliers Brink or the DA in Tshwane is no different to a rural Eastern Cape resident who votes ANC or someone from KwaZulu-Natal voting MK because of their statements against corruption.
Only one mayor has a record of moving Tshwane forward, and that is Dr Nasiphi Moya. Finances have stabilized, credit ratings have risen, debt has reduced audit outcomes have improved, capital budgets have increased, infrastructure renewal has accelerated, metro police expanded, Hammanskraal has clean water and services are reaching more people. There is undeniably a mountain still to climb to address 8 years of DA failures and many years of ANC failures before that. But, unquestionably, the city is moving forward for the first time in a long time. Any rational, self-interested voter in Tshwane would break from identity politics and give Nasiphi Moya 5 more years to finish what she has started rather than voting for those who broke Tshwane to come back.
A Vote For Brink Is A Vote For Bad Government
Any resident of Tshwane who votes for the DA and Cilliers Brink is no different to a rural Eastern Cape resident voting for the ANC, an MK supporter voting for its opposition to corruption or voting for the PA in Beaufort West for Gayton’s promise to turn the town into Dubai. It would be a vote for bad government from a candidate or party with whom a voter has historically identified, willfully or subconsciously ignoring the abundance of evidence of the failed legacy of that party or candidate.
Strong words, right? Fair enough, but these words can be backed up when you consider the following review of the DA’s track record in Tshwane over the 8 years from 2016 to 2024. Every substantiation outlined below is a verifiable and objective fact that can only be ignored by those who do not want facts anywhere near their political choices.
One of the greatest hallmarks of the DA’s track record in Tshwane was its decimation of the finances of the city. When Cilliers Brink left office liquidity in the city stood at 0.6 – for those non-accountants out there anything less than 1 means the city cannot meet its obligation and, were it a business, it would have been liquidated.
The clearest indication of the problem was the growth in debt to ESKOM rising from nothing in 2020 to R6.7 billion in 2024 with ESKOM threatening to cut supply to the city. This shows that the city received payments for electricity from residents and, rather than using revenue from electricity to pay ESKOM as a bulk supplier, they used the funds to pay other obligations that they were unable to pay. In governance terms this is the equivalent of using one credit card to pay off another. When Brink tried to scandalize water tanker expenditure in the city, he inadvertently drew attention to the fact that R179 million in invoices for water tankers incurred under his tenure, had to be paid by Moya’s government because the city was too bankrupt to pay its suppliers.
Service delivery is never insulated from the collapse of municipal finances. In 2016 the City of Tshwane’s capital budget for new infrastructure and renewing old infrastructure was R4 billion. In 2023, for a larger city with greater needs, this had been eroded to just R2 billion. When one factors in just inflation over this time, not even considering the increased charges to residents in this time, this amounts to a 64% decrease in the city’s capital budget. The DA and Brink do not have the intellect to recognize that so now, in opposition, they campaign on the ashes of the infrastructure they collapsed.
The Auditor General (AG) provides the next part of my case. From 2010 to 2021 the City of Tshwane receives unqualified audit opinions – the second highest rating. Then in the financial year ending May 2022, under the DA, it received an adverse audit outcome – the worst outcome available to the AG, citing financial misrepresentations, material irregularities and collapse in the city’s financial health.
From the AG we move to the Hammanskraal Water Crisis which ultimately claimed the lives of 32 residents from cholera in 2023 and denied thousands of people their constitutionally protected right to clean water for years (while invoicing them for it every month). In 2019, under the DA, the R296 million tender to address this crisis through the upgrade of the Rooiwal Wastewater Treatment Plant was awarded to two entities owned by tenderpreneur Edwin Sodi. The ventures had no experience in this line of work, and they lacked the finances to procure the initial equipment or establish the site. The inevitable failures that followed prolonged the water crisis in this community and, in part, led to the deaths of those 32 people. When called upon by their coalition partners to investigate, the DA dragged its feet and resisted, failing even to blacklist Sodi as a service provider.
Anyone remember the Kratos Consortium unsolicited bid in 2023 when DA mayor Randall Williams attempted to force a R26 billion unsolicited bid down the throats of his coalition partners? The agreement was vague and open-ended and believed it was going to cost Tshwane billions in hidden costs. When coalition partners queried this the mayor pressed on in violation of his own coalition agreement. Recordings emerged revealing the mayor addressing municipal officials and intimidating them when they raised legitimate concerns about the legality and cost of the deal and directed to proceed on a procurement decision prohibited for politicians to be involved in. It turned out that Randall Williams’ brother had facilitated the proposal which included a lucrative facilitation deal.
Turn your mind back to the strike in Tshwane in 2023 when municipal services collapsed in the city. It arose because the city, under the DA, had concluded a three-year wage agreement with workers offering sub-inflation increases against which they reneged on two of the three years of the agreement. This was another sign of the financial distress described earlier. The problem is that such an agreement is binding in law in South Africa unless renegotiated by both parties and Brink and the DA, clearly after watching a Margaret Thatcher documentary that week, decided this was a hill to mount a public chest-thumping display for their constituents. Coalition partners implored a negotiated solution to no avail and, in 2025, the city was required to backpay over a billion rand to the workers in one of many ways in which the DA and Brink’s failures reached beyond the grave of their term to impede Nasiphi Moya’s turnaround efforts.
And, just for fun, who can forget the unique circumstances of the departure of DA mayor Stevens Mokgalapa in 2020 when an audio recording emerged of him having sex with one of his DA MMCs in the office? Another low for Tshwane in a lone line of lows.
Everything I have described above is verifiable, objective facts. Objectively, the DA and Brink’s tenure in Tshwane has been comparatively amongst the worst of any party or leader in local government. The only reason to ignore them would be because these facts clash with one’s identity politics and arising voting intention. But make no mistake, a vote for Cilliers Brink or the DA in Tshwane is no different to a rural Eastern Cape resident who votes ANC or someone from KwaZulu-Natal voting MK because of their statements against corruption.
Only one mayor has a record of moving Tshwane forward, and that is Dr Nasiphi Moya. Finances have stabilized, credit ratings have risen, debt has reduced audit outcomes have improved, capital budgets have increased, infrastructure renewal has accelerated, metro police expanded, Hammanskraal has clean water and services are reaching more people. There is undeniably a mountain still to climb to address 8 years of DA failures and many years of ANC failures before that. But, unquestionably, the city is moving forward for the first time in a long time. Any rational, self-interested voter in Tshwane would break from identity politics and give Nasiphi Moya 5 more years to finish what she has started rather than voting for those who broke Tshwane to come back.